A Proxy Battle and a Clash of Egos is Now Holding Back HMNY & MoviePass Stock

Chris Kelly – Original MoviePass Investor

A clash of titans and silicon valley egos is colliding and it is taking down HMNY stock price and could possibly take down the MoviePass ship altogether if not resolved soon.

As Ben Rabizadeh stated in his article on Seeking Alpha last month.

“there is only one news event which can permanently put a bottom in the stock and turn things around; that is resolution of proxy.”

Ben’s words could not be truer today as we sit at .65 cents a share hoping for a miracle.

I wanted to know, what is going on with the Proxy – what happened to our IPO moment and this huge potential opportunity of MoviePass.   I have been digging and digging on this, I have reached out to multiple company officials at both MoviePass and HMNY neither will comment.

I have been in contact with other investors who claim to have contacts who know what is going on inside the proxy battle.  I want to fully disclose that I cannot disclose the sources I have, nor can I fully vouch for these sources given they feel it necessary to either stay totally anonymous and or they will not reveal their own sources.    That said, I have spent many hours on this, digging through SEC filings, reaching out to past employees of MoviePass, talking to investors long and short about the situation.   Here is what I have found.

Apparently, there continues to be a disagreement between Chirs Kelly and Ted Farnsworth on how to resolve the proxy.  For those not familiar,  Chris Kelly, who was Facebook’s Cheif Privacy Officer, was the lead investor in MoviePass’s Series A round financing.    Chris has had a past of getting special concessions out of Farnsworth and HMNY since the beginning -when the odd relationship was formed with Ted and Mitch to bring MoviePass and HMNY together.   If you go back to the old SEC filings at the beginning of the HMNY acquisition of MoviePass you can see that Kelly was able to carve out special concessions from Farnsworth.  Likely because Kelly did not trust Farnsworth because of his shady past.   The following comes from the original Share Purchase Agreement:

(b)          Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Helios agrees to purchase at the Closing and MoviePass agrees to sell and issue to Helios at the Closing, such number of shares of MoviePass common stock, $0.0001 par value per share (the “Common Stock ”), equal to fifty one percent (51%) of the then outstanding shares of Common Stock of MoviePass (on a fully-diluted basis, giving effect to the payment or conversion of any notes that convert into MoviePass capital stock that are outstanding immediately prior to the Closing, but excluding any outstanding options to purchase shares of Common Stock and warrants to purchase shares of MoviePass’s capital stock and the shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of the Kelly Note (as defined below)) for an aggregate purchase price of up to $27,000,000 (the “ Maximum Purchase Price ”), payable as provided in Subsection 1.1(c) below.  The shares of Common Stock issued to Helios pursuant to this Agreement (excluding, for the avoidance of doubt the Kelly Conversion Shares (as defined below)) shall be referred to in this Agreement as the “ Shares .”  MoviePass further agrees that upon conversion of the Kelly Note by Helios in connection with the Closing, it will issue the shares of Common Stock issuable under the Kelly Note; provided, that in the event that the number of shares of Common Stock to be issued thereunder is less than two percent (2%) of the then outstanding shares of Common Stock of MoviePass (on a fully-diluted basis, giving effect to the payment or conversion of any notes that convert into MoviePass capital stock that are outstanding immediately prior to the Closing, but excluding any outstanding options to purchase shares of Common Stock and warrants to purchase shares of MoviePass’s capital stock and the shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of the Kelly Note), MoviePass hereby agrees that the Kelly Note will be convertible into such number of shares of Common Stock to provide Helios with the foregoing two percent (2%) interest under the Kelly Note (the shares of Common Stock to be issued under the Kelly Note, the “ Kelly Conversion Shares ”).

This clause has all kinds of interesting stuff in here.  But one thing is for certain, Kelly had a loan to MoviePass, that was convertible to shares, and it looks like both parties were suspicious of each other and naturally trying to protect their own interests.  What is notable is that Kelly was the only special case noted in the entire agreement with Helios and the only outlier noted  in the SEC filings.  Kelly has some sway with now things go with MoviePass and HMNY.

Mitch Lowe and Ted Farnsworth

Culture Clash of Titans

Kelly and Farnsworth could not be more different.   Kelly is a lawyer, who has made it big and has a stellar reputation.  You don’t get to be the Chief Privacy Officer at a company the like of Facebook without having your reputation totally in hand.   Kelly is now a major VC investor, Pro Sports team owner, and silicon valley royalty.  He runs in all the right circles and knows all the right people.

Farnsworth is a huckster and a hustler from Miami. He has burned shareholders with several wipeouts in the past.  His most notable achievements were the psychic network and his total faceplant with purple energy drink, a company he tried to create to compete with Monster Beverage.  He claims Highlander Companies – a Miami Real Estate venture targeting millennials in his SEC Bio – but an exhaustive search brings up nothing about the company.  Farnsworth is the kind of guy that Kelly would normally eat for breakfast.  Kelly apparently has no respect for Farnsworth at all, and likely regrets that he has to deal with in any capacity.

Mitch Lowe stands in the middle of these two guys.  Mitch’s reputation stands strong being associated with both Netflix and Redbox, but big hits and winners for Mitch.   However, Mitch is a super unique type of entrepreneur, he is a high school drop out, he started off with an oddball business selling movie blacklight movie posters in Europe.  He is not your typical blue-blood silicon valley, Ivy Leaguer, MBA.  Mitch has real street cred, but he does it his own way with grit.

When you bring these kinds of personalities together, I can tell you from experience – these big egos clash – big time.  That is what is now happening behind the scenes at HMNY and MoviePass.

IPO vs. Reverse Merger Who Wins What?

Retail investors shouldn’t really care very much how the Proxy is resolved, we just want it resolved and fast.  The benefits of removing the Proxy status are many.  It provides MoviePass better and cheaper access to more capital, it makes it much easier to sell the story of the company, and it clears up a ton of brand confusion with HMNY that just continues to linger.   It is one of the primary reasons that the stock price is getting killed, and the dilution of shares is happening on the cheap right now.

Kelly wants a MoviePass IPO, it is not exactly clear why he wants this, but it is easy to speculate.  Kelly likely believes that the company is undervalued, and he wants to see a bigger return on his original investment in the company.  It is impossible to know how many shares of MoviePass Kelly currently holds, but he is for sure one of the biggest holders of the company left in the cap table, and he wants to maximize that holding.  Kelly and original MP investors only have the remaining 8.2% of the company left to bargain with.  In many ways Kelly likely regrets giving up as much of the company he has, knowing that they have the potential to go big now.   Further, it is likely that Kelly wants to have a bigger say in the company’s future, he likely does not want Farnsworth in his way or in his company.  Kelly likely wants a seat on the board, and some other board members with him that align with his way of thinking.  An IPO helps Kelly with his ego – which apparently he has a very large one.  He wants MoviePass to be his trophy, not Farnsworth’s.

Kelly allowed Mitch to do a deal with the devil in Farnsworth, to finance the big $9.95 go for scale play.  None of them had any idea at the time that they were going to strike lightning in a bottle the way they did when the offer was first introduced.   The surge of subscribers took on a life of its own and caught the company and its investors totally off guard.   This is why the company suffered so many growing pains so quickly, from blackouts, to customer service problems, PR glitches and all the rest.  They just were not ready to be instant rock stars.

You only have to look at to SEC filings of the Share Purchase Agreement,  to understand that the goals put forth were blown away by a factor of 10  in a matter of one month.  Even Mitch commented in his video interviews they thought they would get about 100,000 subscribers in a year, and they were way over that in a month.   So yes – they were all caught off guard.   Except maybe less so for Mitch – who was always the advocate for lowering the price and driving the business to big scale.

 

Closing; provided however , that 666,667 of the Helios Closing Shares shall be subject to forfeiture by MoviePass if MoviePass fails to achieve either of the following two milestones within the specified time frame: (A) within one year after the Closing, subscribers to MoviePass’ MoviePass product shall have exceeded on at least one (1) day 100,000 subscribers (such number of subscribers to be determined based upon the number of registered accounts on the MoviePass server that have contracted with MoviePass (through a 3 rd party or otherwise)

With that huge hit of momentum, Farnsworth has felt emboldened by the big bet he had made, and he wants to take total control of MoviePass.  Farnsworth’s desire is to try and take out Kelly and the remaining MoviePass stockholders 8.2% stake out on the cheap.   They now have far less say on what Farnsworth can and can’t do with the company.

To do it Farnsworth is taking another big gamble.  Instead of agreeing to whatever Kelly’s demands for an IPO likely with favorable terms for Kelly, Farnsworth is riding on like the cowboy he is.  He has essentially given Kelly the finger.  Last week’s 8K and the continued dilution to raise money to fund the MoviePass subscriber growth is Farnsworth’s way of saying, “Hey Chris – I can do this without you now, you can either give in now or give in later”.  Farnsworth is not afraid to roll the dice here and force this go his way. By selling more shares in HMNY he is, in essence, diluting down Kelly more as well.   Yes, this hurts the stock price, and it even hurts Farnsworth by hitting him in the pocketbook, Farnsworth is the largest shareholder of HMNY, and he has a bonus structure heavily tied to the market cap of the company, which he is now wildly far away from achieving.

It’s a dangerous game being played by two big egos fighting for their right to control the next big unicorn company.  Unfortunately, retail stockholders are caught in the middle.  Ted is pressing on, diluting shares for more funding, and pushing to be the leader of the band.   Kelly has bunkered down and is trying to find a way to get his IPO.  What we don’t know is what other cards Kelly might have to play if any.  For now, Kelly can just refuse to sell his shares to Farnsworth for a reasonable price, holding up the reverse merger and all the goodness that could come from that.  If Kelly has any other cards, we don’t know but I am sure we will soon find out.

When this is resolved, the buy signal will be on.  It will remove a key blocker for big money managers to invest in the company, it will allow Farnsworth to get debt financing at much more reasonable terms.  Getting debt right now is extremely difficult due to the proxy fight, nobody wants that kind of a legal headache.

I will keep digging here, if you know more please share it with me.  As retail investors, we should put the fire to these guys push them to resolve their differences so we can all prosper!

 


For Reference SEC Filing on MPSA

MoviePass Subscription Agreement

 

Background

 

As previously disclosed, on August 15, 2017, Helios and Matheson Analytics Inc. (“Helios”) entered into a Securities Purchase Agreement with MoviePass Inc. (“MoviePass”), which Helios and MoviePass amended on October 6, 2017 (collectively, the “MoviePass Purchase Agreement”). On December 11, 2017, pursuant to the MoviePass Purchase Agreement, Helios purchased shares of MoviePass’ common stock, par value $0.0001 per share (the “MoviePass Common Stock”) totaling 57.8% of the outstanding MoviePass Common Stock (excluding shares underlying MoviePass options and warrants) after giving effect to the transaction (the “Acquisition”).

 

As previously disclosed, on October 11, 2017, Helios and MoviePass entered into an investment option agreement (the “Option Agreement”), pursuant to which MoviePass granted Helios an option to purchase additional shares of MoviePass Common Stock in an amount up to $20 million (the “Option”). From November 2, 2017 through December 15, 2017, Helios exercised the Option in full. Upon full exercise of the Option, Helios owned 62.41% of the outstanding shares of MoviePass Common Stock (excluding shares underlying MoviePass options and warrants).

 

Helios previously announced the closing of the Acquisition in a Current Report on Form 8-K, filed on December 11, 2017, containing the audited financial statements of MoviePass for the years ended December 31, 2016 and 2015, and the unaudited pro forma combined financial statements of Helios and MoviePass (which Helios amended by filing a Current Report on Form 8-K/A on February 9, 2018).

 

As previously disclosed, on March 8, 2018, Helios and MoviePass entered into a Subscription Agreement (the “March Subscription Agreement”), pursuant to which, in lieu of repayment of $55,525,000 in cash advances made by Helios to MoviePass from December 19, 2017 through February 20, 2018, MoviePass agreed to issue to Helios and Helios agreed to accept, based on an agreed $240 million pre-money valuation of MoviePass, an amount of MoviePass Common Stock which, when added to the amount of MoviePass Common Stock owned by Helios immediately prior to entering into the March Subscription Agreement, caused Helios to own 81.2% of the then outstanding shares of MoviePass Common Stock (excluding shares underlying MoviePass options and warrants).

 

New Subscription Agreement with MoviePass

 

From February 27, 2018 through April 13, 2018, Helios provided cash advances to MoviePass to support MoviePass’ working capital and operational requirements, as well as to support the expansion of MoviePass’ business plans and objectives. The total amount advanced by Helios to MoviePass during this period totaled $35,000,000 (the “Advance”).

 

On April 16, 2018, Helios entered into a Subscription Agreement with MoviePass (the “April Subscription Agreement”), pursuant to which, in lieu of MoviePass repaying the Advance, MoviePass agreed to issue to Helios, and Helios agreed to accept, based on an agreed $295.525 million pre-money valuation of MoviePass as of March 31, 2018, an amount of MoviePass Common Stock which, when added to the amount of MoviePass Common Stock owned by Helios immediately prior to entering into the April Subscription Agreement, caused Helios to own 91.8% of the then outstanding shares of MoviePass Common Stock (excluding shares underlying MoviePass options and warrants).

 

Accordingly, as of April 16, 2018, Helios owns 91.8% of the outstanding shares of MoviePass Common Stock (excluding shares underlying MoviePass options and warrants). MoviePass has no class of shares outstanding or designated other than Common Stock.

 

 

 

Why Did HMNY (MoviePass) File That Alarming 8K?

We all now know that HMNY filed an 8K that set off alarm bells, causing a media panic claiming MP was close to running out of cash, sinking the stock 60% in two days.

The specific statement read.

As of April 30, 2018, we had approximately $15.5 million in available cash and approximately $27.9 million on deposit with our merchant processors for a total of approximately $43.4 million. The funds held by our merchant processors represent a portion of the payments received for annual and other extended term MoviePass subscription plans, which we classify as accounts receivable on our balance sheet and which we expect to be disbursed to us during the course of 2018. We believe that our average cash deficit has been approximately $21.7 million per month from September 30, 2017 to April 30, 2018. By the end of April 2018, we implemented certain measures to promote the fair use of our MoviePass subscription product, which we believe should reduce our monthly cash deficit significantly. These measures include a technological enhancement which prevents MoviePass subscribers from sharing their accounts with non-subscribers and allowing subscribers to see a movie title only once per subscriber using the MoviePass subscription. We believe these measures enabled us to reduce our cash deficit during the first week of May 2018 by more than 35%. In addition, by returning to our $9.95 per month unlimited MoviePass subscription, enabling subscribers to see up to one new movie title per day, we believe our subscriber acquisitions and subscription revenues will continue to increase for the foreseeable future. However, we will need proceeds from sales of our common stock pursuant to our Equity Distribution Agreement with Canaccord Genuity, or other sources of capital, starting in May 2018. Further, if we use all or a portion of the anticipated net proceeds from sales of our common stock pursuant to our Equity Distribution Agreement with Canaccord Genuity for acquisitions of other companies or financial interests in additional movies (through our subsidiary, MoviePass Ventures), we will need additional capital to offset our monthly cash deficit. In 2018, we expect our cash deficit from month to month will vary significantly based on the amount of movie tickets MoviePass is required to purchase for its subscribers during the month, the amount we spend on acquiring financial interests in additional movies through MoviePass Ventures, the amount we may spend on any other types of acquisitions, and our ability to develop the MoviePass business model in the near term generally, including developing and growing sources of revenue other than subscription revenue. Because the length of time and costs associated with the development of the MoviePass and MoviePass Ventures business model is highly uncertain, we are unable to estimate the actual funds we will require. If we are unable to obtain sufficient amounts of additional capital, whether through our Equity Distribution Agreement or otherwise, we may be required to reduce the scope of our planned growth or otherwise alter our business model, objectives and operations, which could harm our business, financial condition and operating results.

But many of us could not figure out WHY the company came out with this statement, and why NOW?!  There was very little new news in the statement.   If you break it down, the company said they will need to raise more cash, which they have already said they had planned to do by selling shares, and they said they would do this as they needed the funds.  So that was nothing new.   The cash burn level reported was also not new news.  Mitch and Ted have both said that they were burning in the $20M a month range in several previous interviews.   The statement also said that management had taken steps to reduce COGS, and that by adding the limitation of only seeing a title one time, and enforcing photos of ticket stubs, had reduced usage and fraud, helping to bring usage down more than 35%.   This was great news, but it had also been mentioned in prior interviews earlier in the week.  Nothing really new again!

So why then did HMNY – MoviePass -feel the need to release this 8K at all?   I have researched this, and the answer is that this is a requirement that they must fulfill by SEC regulation based on that fact that they are operating under a “going concern” audit finding.    The going concern part of this is nothing new.  In fact, it has been known for some time now.   What most investors do not realize is that once you have this finding attached to your company, the disclosure rules for the company change.

This is a complicated bit of accounting rules and regulations and if you want all the details you can read them here.  But the cliff notes version is that any updates both positive and negative that could significantly impact the “going concern” status of the company must be announced as they occur.    So the changes to MoviePass to reduce cash burn had to be disclosed.  And with those changes, the change to the cash position, and the intention to stick to the plan of raising more money with additional stock, also had to be disclosed.  Regardless of the fact that both of these things were already known by investors who were closely following the company.

To put a fine point on it – new developments that are POSITIVE – that will help reduce the “going-concern” issue with the company, must be disclosed.

Specifically —-

“The going-concern standard explains that these disclosures may change over time as new information becomes available and that disclosure of how the substantial doubt was resolved is required in the period in which substantial doubt no longer exists (before or after consideration of management’s plans). In addition, the going-concern standard states that the mitigating effects of management’s plans to alleviate substantial doubt should be evaluated only if (1) the plans are approved before the financial statement issuance date and (2) dboth of the following conditions are met: a. It is probable that management’s plans will be effectively implemented within one year after the date that the financial statements are issued. b. It is probable that management’s plans, when implemented, will mitigate the relevant conditions or events that raise substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern within one year after the date that the financial statements are issued.”

It is reasonable to believe that Mitch and Ted actually believed that the filing was routine and that there was some substantially positive news in the filing that had only been mentioned one or two times in TV interviews, and this filing would make it official that MoviePass is making great progress in moving toward a more profitable future.

Unfortunately, the 8K hit within less than 24 hours of AMC CEO Adam Aron throwing MoviePass under the bus.   Adam made a bunch of nasty and false comments on how MoviePass was certain to be in a death spiral.  And made a bunch of false assertions on usage amongst other bizarre comments.

The timing could not have been worse for HMNY to release the 8K, it set off a literal $hit storm of bad headlines, causing retail investors to panic sell the stock.

Was this bad execution on the part of HMNY?  Probably – however as SEC forms go, it takes a few days to file them and companies may not know exactly what day the form will hit the SEC website.   So maybe it was just unfortunate bad timing.

Should HMNY and MoviePass do more to stop the stock price from falling?  Maybe, but there could be other restrictions they are under for releasing information.  We are close to ER, where there is normally a quiet period prior.  Also, we don’t know what is happening with the final acquisition of MoviePass and the rebranding of HMNY to MoviePass.  Also, we don’t know what is happening with the spinoff of Zone and if there is a quiet period there.

It is actually possible that this entire episode is very much ado about nothing.  And that Mitch and Ted both have their hands tied in how much more they can really say to calm investors fear of near-term Bankruptcy.   Afterall, Farnsworth and Lowe have both stated in separate interviews that they are confident they have plenty of options for additional funding and that they at least are not worried at all about insolvency.

My conclusion, the drop was scary and shook out a lot of early shareholders and retail investors who just don’t have the stomach to take these kinds of losses, even if they are just on paper until you sell.  The series of events was a great gift to the short sellers who are paying big money to short this stock because they don’t believe in the model, or they have ulterior motives for wanting to have HMNY not be successful.

It seems unlikely that HMNY is headed for Bankruptcy anytime soon given they have virtually zero debt, and a lot of options to keep on trucking as a “going concern”.

My view – if you liked this stock at $7 or $4 or even $2 – you should love the stock NOW at .85 cents!

Nothing significant has really changed!   Go review all the video interviews I have cataloged here.   You will see that the story has been consistent, that there was really no big new news at all, and that Farnsworth and Lowe consistently have said they would need to raise more money as they built out a 5 Million user subscriber base.

Don’t let greedy Wall Street hedge funds and sneaky short attacks from competitors like AMC scare you out of what will be a great long term investment!   Hang in there, average down if you can stomach it.

As Mark Twain once said.

“The rumors of my death have been greatly exaggerated”

A Detailed Revenue Model On How The MoviePass Business Can Succeed

As a former GM of Product Management for Microsoft I spent countless hours creating and reviewing complicated revenue models for large scale businesses.  Revenue models bring together all of the various revenue opportunities a unit/company expects to see.  The model makes assumptions for every aspect of the business – pricing, sell through, inventory, growth rates, competition, conversion etc etc.   They are complicated beasts – so complicated in fact a model with just slightly different assumptions can create radially different results and viewpoints of a business’s feasibility .

At Microsoft revenue models typically have multiple reviews, every assumption is talked about, tested wherever possible, debated by the best and brightest at the company, and finally submitted to executive management. The models are then used for funding specific initiatives for things like headcount, marketing budgets and other costs related to executing against a business plan.  The revenue models are eventually used by the company to make estimates for Wall St. on future revenues and earnings.

I spent more than 20 years in the sausage factory where these models are created debated and reported.   I can tell you with certainty, these models consistently have less than 50% accuracy.  All models have politics, specific agendas and bias baked into them.  The truth in models is almost always somewhere in the middle of the most optimistic assumptions and the most negative assumptions.  It is important to know when reading any model, what is the agenda of the person who created that model?   Is he/she looking to secure funding?  Is the person looking to kill the business because they would prefer some other initiative to succeed?   What does a person have to gain or lose if their viewpoint of the model is accepted as the “truth”.    I have witnessed many a Machiavellian business leaders purposely input wildly implausible assumptions into models to serve their own purposes and to advance their own personal fortunes.  It happens all the time.

I felt like it was important for me to introduce a new revenue model for HMNY investors to consider as the only detailed model currently floating around the web is the one published from Mark Gomes.  Gomes has been a consistent basher of MoviePass stock, he spreads a message of fear uncertainty and doubt about the company.  He has maintained that the company will likely end up a penny stock based on the business model and the need for continued capital needs that will come from dilution at bad terms.   I have reviewed Mark’s model (link below) and I believe it is both flawed, and contains some radical assumptions that would not be accepted by any experienced product manager or finance executive who has actually worked on a product like MoviePass.

In my model for MoviePass  (Link Below) I show how MoviePass can achieve profitability by the end of the year, as predicted by Ted Farnsworth CEO of MoviePass multiple times in the past.   My assumptions are relatively conservative across the board, and they align to the major assumptions that have been shared from Mitch Lowe (CEO MoviePass) and Farnsworth and they are outlined in the notes of the shared spreadsheet.   To create the model it is necessary to pull together public comments from both of the key executives of the company, and to research other various sources.   It is no simple matter, but with some time and thought a reasonable view of the company can be put together.

I invite you to compare Mark Gome’s model with my own.  It may well be that the truth is somewhere in the middle.   I am as my readers know, very bullish on MoviePass, so my view may be too rose colored.   I can almost guarantee that Mark’s view is way too pessimistic.

Mark Gomes MoviePass Model

2 Major Assumptions from Mark’s MoviePass Model of where I disagree include:

  1. Mark has a very radical assumption in his last two months of 2018 where Utilization Rate (# of movie tickets per month per sub)  jumps to 3.7 in November 2018 and  4.1  in December 2018.   Mark does this to account for high movie going season.   That would be acceptable if he dropped the rates lower in other months, but he does not.  That is likely not at all a realistic view of utilization rate and is estimated super high to make the cash burn look way worse.  It also does not consider new moves by the company to limit number of movies view on the new plans.  Mark even admits in his model that he uses a number of movies seen that “makes no sense” but was offered by Mitch and Ted, so he uses it anyway.  Mark has conflated some very important things here.  Mitch and Ted were likely including the “halo” effect that MoviePass has, where people bring friends and family members who don’t have a MoviePass.  At any rate, Mark cherry picks number here to make things look way worse than they likely will be for his November and December estimates.
  2. Mark assumes an $11 dollar Movie Ticket Price.  That is way above the $9 ticket rate reported by industry metrics.

Mark and I are reasonably close on other assumptions.  That makes sense, because utilization rates and ticket price are clearly two of the biggest factors in the models.  I hold my utilization factor constant at 1.4 movies per month – less than the 1.2 factor often used by Mitch.  I don’t factor in big seasonality jumps simply to show a simpler model, and because I believe subscription users are less likely to be as seasonal as normal movie going audience.   This is something I can adjust for later on as I fine tune the model.

Here is a link to the model.   I welcome your feedback, comments and thoughts.   I will be adjusting the model regularly as new information come available.   In summary, my model shows it is very possible for MoviePass to breakeven on a yearly run rate basis by the end of the year.  Meaning they could breakeven in 2019.

Bob Visse’s MoviePass Model